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DESIRE, CONSERVATISM, UNDERFUNDING, CONGRESSIONAL 
MEDDLING, AND STUDY FATIGUE: INGREDIENTS FOR 
ONGOING REFORM AT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION? 
Joan MacLeod Heminway 
In the spring of 2010, after two years of significant reform efforts 
undertaken to address perceived weaknesses in its rulemaking and 
enforcement activities (alleged failings that have been blamed for the 
financial crisis and Bernie Madoff debacle), the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was rewarded for its efforts with a 
congressional provision in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act)1 that compels ongoing 
reform efforts based on the results of a third-party examination. 
Not later than the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this subtitle, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the “SEC”) shall hire an 
independent consultant of high caliber and with expertise in 
organizational restructuring and the operations of capital markets to 
examine the internal operations, structure, funding, and the need for 
comprehensive reform of the SEC, as well as the SEC’s relationship with 
and the reliance on self-regulatory organizations and other entities 
relevant to the regulation of securities and the protection of securities 
investors that are under the SEC’s oversight.2 
This is the text that introduces the general mandate of Section 967 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act (Section 967).  The section goes on to prescribe 
general areas of study and require that the independent consultant render 
a report to the SEC and the U.S. Congress “[n]ot later than the end of 
the 150-day period after being retained.”3  That report—256 pages, not 
including the cover page, table of contents, and glossary (BCG 
Report)—was issued on March 10, 2011, over three years before work 
 
  W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law; 
J.D., New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University.  Work on this Article was 
supported by thoughtful comments from Arthur Laby and members of the faculty at Suffolk University 
Law School and by research funding from The University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.dodd-frank-act.us/Dodd_Frank_ 
Act_Text_Section_967.html. 
 2. Id. § 967(a)(1). 
 3. Id. §§ 967(a)(2), 967(b). 
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on this Article was completed.4 
Having earlier written about SEC reform efforts in recent years and 
having been interested—in fact, amazed—by the number and type of 
studies included in the Dodd–Frank Act,5 I began to wonder whether 
Section 967 and the resulting BCG Report were, are, and will be useful 
and efficient.  Did Congress make the right decision in the Dodd–Frank 
Act about how to approach the need for ongoing, targeted reforms at the 
SEC to make it a more functional, effectual regulatory agency?  I 
initially had to admit that I was unclear on the best way to answer that 
question, but I knew I wanted to try.  I started my inquiry with what I 
already knew.  My existing knowledge led me to a number of 
observations at the intersection of the SEC’s then existing reform efforts 
and Section 967. 
In prior works on the topic of SEC reform, I used change leadership 
literature (a branch of business management scholarship) to assess the 
potential success of the SEC’s ongoing efforts to restructure itself and 
its operations.6  In these articles, I contended that the SEC’s pre-Dodd–
Frank and early post-Dodd–Frank reform efforts bear earmarks of 
potential success based on various factors catalogued in change 
leadership literature.7  I noted, in the more recent of the two articles, that 
former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s public communications about 
the BCG Report just prior to its release were evidence of her possible 
status as a wartime leader, a type of leader that may be successful in 
making lasting institutional reforms.8  I further observed that the 
institutional study that resulted in the BCG Report appeared to help 
develop or restore interconnections among personnel in the SEC that 
may be important to successful organizational change: 
The recent examination of SEC operations conducted by the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG), required under the Dodd–Frank Act, re-
engaged the SEC’s staff in the ongoing reform dialogue (by incorporating 
 
 4. BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM (2011) [hereinafter BCG Report], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf. 
 5. Joan Heminway, Dodd–Frank Forum—And Now for Something Completely Different, 
CONGLOMERATE (July 21, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/07/doddfrank-forum-and-now-
for-something-completely-different.html. 
 6. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities and Exchange 
Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 627, 630 (2010) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Reframing], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688147; Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Sustaining Reform Efforts at the SEC: A Progress Report, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 1, 1 (2011) [hereinafter Heminway, Sustaining], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859045. 
 7. See Heminway, Reframing, supra note 6, at 659; Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 1–
9. 
 8. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 2. 
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staff input) and, in the process, accorded credit to diverse viewpoints, 
encouraged transparency and feedback relating to ongoing reforms, and 
reconnected members of the SEC staff to the agency and its efforts to 
transform itself.  Although the study was conducted by a third party 
engaged by the SEC rather than directly by the SEC leadership, the work 
done by BCG re-enforced and extended earlier work done by SEC leaders 
in their self-assessments of aspects of SEC operations.  The common 
element of these efforts is staff engagement in the organizational change 
process, as opposed to top-down imposition of reforms—the treatment of 
the SEC as a living system, not a machine.9 
Finally, I noted that the BCG Report and the related congressional 
mandates of periodic reporting in the Dodd–Frank Act (which call for 
reports to Congress at six-month intervals over a period of two years)10 
should help to sustain the SEC’s focus on aligning and clarifying its 
organizational structure, another established element of successful 
organizational change.11  These observations lend some analysis to the 
question of whether Section 967 is efficacious and tend to support the 
view that that Section 967 and the BCG Report may be effectual.  But 
they are preliminary and incomplete observations. 
I also observed that, despite the SEC’s honest and open desire to 
improve itself, the nature of the SEC itself—sometimes portrayed as an 
inflexible, officious government unit—might complicate the effective 
and efficient implementation of Section 967 and the overall prospects 
for success in the SEC’s reform efforts.  There may be two opposing 
forces at work in the area of SEC institutional reform in the post-
financial-crisis era, with the outcome of that opposition being uncertain: 
 
 9. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 10. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 967(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  Specifically, these 
congressional reporting requirements last for two years after the issuance of the BCG Report (i.e., 
through March 2013). 
Not later than the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date the consultant issues 
the report under subsection (b), and every 6-months thereafter during the 2-year period 
following the date on which the consultant issues such report, the SEC shall issue a 
report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate describing the SEC’s 
implementation of the regulatory and administrative recommendations contained in the 
consultant’s report. 
Id.  Three reports have been issued to date.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 30, 2012) [hereinafter March 2012 SEC 
Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/secorgreformreport-2012-df967.pdf; SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter September 2011 SEC Report], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/secorgreformreport-df967.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT 
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter October 2012 SEC Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/sec-
organizational-reform-recommendations-101712.pdf. 
 11. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 7. 
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 First is the sincere desire, especially among senior policymakers, to 
effect meaningful, thoughtful, and progressive regulatory change.  The 
crisis caused many within the agencies to rethink the priorities and 
processes of regulation, and has strengthened the hand of those most 
inclined to ask difficult questions, challenge the status quo, and try new 
ideas. 
 Set against this progressive force is the deep conservatism of the 
agencies themselves.  The federal agencies that supervise banks and 
oversee capital markets are highly regimented and bureaucratic.  
Information, insight, and warning signs are often not acted on or shared 
without first being reviewed and approved at each level of the 
organizational hierarchy.  Among different agencies, competing agendas 
can sometimes win out over close cooperation.  New rules will of course 
be developed as required, but new attitudes and new ways of working 
will be harder to come by.12 
This complex, dissonant characterization of the SEC—as open-minded 
and reformist, yet also conservative, hierarchical, and slow-moving—
rings true to me.  One legal commentator once noted that “[w]e can 
compare U.S. government policy changes to the navigation of a 
supertanker.  One does not see the results of any effort to back water or 
change course for a considerable time.”13 
Another apparent counterweight to the SEC’s desire for reform has 
been a lack of sufficient resources.  Financial capital and human capital 
at the SEC are in relatively short supply (and have been deficient during 
the entire reform period).  The underfunding of the SEC has been a 
matter of public debate at a number of junctures during the recent SEC 
reform process and, as I have noted elsewhere, threatens to impede the 
implementation of reform initiatives.14  Specifically, the scarcity of 
funding to support follow-through on study findings under the Dodd–
Frank Act may mean that the prescribed studies will merely constitute 
legislative relics. 
The timing of Congress’s enactment of Section 967 is an additional 
possible area of concern.  Why interrupt an existing reform campaign to 
evaluate it or start a new one?  To the extent that Section 967 can be 
seen as an extension (rather than an interruption) of the reform work 
begun by former Chairman Schapiro and other SEC leaders,15 why 
impose new processes on the organization and its change leaders—
 
 12. JOHN LESTER & JOHN BOVENZI, THE DODD–FRANK ACT: WHAT IT DOES, WHAT IT MEANS, 
AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/OW_EN_FS_Publ_2010_The_Dodd_Frank_Act.pdf. 
 13. William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years (1980–89): 
The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645, 647 (1994). 
 14. Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 9–12. 
 15. See Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6, at 6. 
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adding cost to the reform process by requiring the retention of an outside 
expert for an initial assessment and diverting the time of the SEC’s 
leadership and staff to engage in programmatic self-assessment by 
participating in a study and ongoing reporting?  “Might the SEC have 
done just as well in continuing on the road to reform it had been on pre-
Dodd–Frank? . . . .”16 
Finally, I noted that Section 967 is only one among many legislative 
provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act that call for the completion of studies 
and related action by or at the SEC in addition to the substantive 
rulemaking provided for under the Dodd–Frank Act.17  Layer onto that 
the studies required under §§ 106, 402, and 504 of the recently enacted 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act18 and the report required 
under Section 7 of the Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge 
(STOCK) Act19. . . .  “Study fatigue” (if there is such a thing), in 
addition to general regulatory overload (including in connection with 
other provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, the JOBS Act, and the STOCK 
Act), seemed probable. 
In sum, I determined that the SEC has exhibited a desire to engage in 
honest reform, despite its overall conservatism.  Yet, underfunding, 
congressional meddling, and study fatigue present real barriers to 
success.  Beyond these observations on the SEC’s reform efforts, 
however, I remained somewhat at a loss as to how to approach the 
question of Section 967’s utility as an agency reform tool in the short 
term and long term, especially given recent changes in the leadership of 
the SEC occasioned by former Chairman Schapiro’s resignation 
effective in December 2012 (resulting in Elisse Walter assuming the 
position of Chairman) 20 and President Obama’s subsequent nomination 
 
 16. Heminway, supra note 5. 
 17. The National Economic Research Associates, Inc. has produced a chart showing sixteen SEC 
studies provided for in Dodd–Frank and their relevant deadlines.  NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASS’N, 
ECON. CONSULTING, STUDIES—SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (2012), available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/Securities_and_Exchange_Commission.pdf.  A summary provided by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness lists twenty-four SEC 
studies.  CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010: SUMMARY OF 
RULEMAKING, STUDIES, AND CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS BY TITLE, available at 
http://chamberpost.typepad.com/files/dodd-frank-summary-sheet.pdf.  A leading law firm catalogues 
eighteen SEC studies.  DAVIS POLK, DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG//July2011_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf. 
 18. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 102, 402, 504, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012). 
 19. Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 
§ 7, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
 20. See Paul Davidson & Tim Mullaney, Elisse Walter Tapped to Lead SEC; Mary Schapiro 
Leaving, U.S.A. TODAY (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2012/11/26/mary-schapiro-sec-leaving/1726837/; Ben 
Protess & Susanne Craig, Rebuilding Wall Street’s Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 26, 2012, 
5
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and the U.S. Senate’s confirmation of Mary Jo White as Chairman.21  I 
knew that what I was searching for was in the nature of an assessment 
tool.  What I needed was a rubric for the evaluation of Section 967 and 
the SEC’s related program of reform.  My prior work incorporating the 
literature of change leadership and change management was not up to 
this task.  That literature identifies attributes of people and processes 
that predict a likelihood of success in reform efforts; it does not measure 
the efficacy of reform efforts. 
By (as I have done before) reaching outside the law, I have been able 
to acquire some additional insight (even if not the simple rubric I 
sought).  Social scientists have developed and contribute to a field of 
study—program evaluation—that holds promise in resolving questions 
about the propriety and potential success of institutional reforms at the 
SEC, including those under Section 967.  This field encourages the 
thorough, systematized assessment of the programs, agendas, and plans 
of various types of organizations.  Program evaluation in the 
governmental agency realm interfaces with public administration, 
including agency reform efforts.22  The mandates of Section 967 may 
exemplify good program evaluation in federal government.  If they do, 
there is reason to believe that Section 967 may be worth the paper on 
which it is written and worthy of the SEC’s continued attention as it 
continues down a reform-oriented path. 
In Part I of this Article, I describe what I have learned about the 
general contours of program evaluation and its application in the context 
of administrative reform efforts, in each case based on existing program 
evaluation and public administration literature.  I then briefly link this 
overview back to my earlier work on change leadership at the SEC.  In 
Part II, I provide an assessment of the content and implementation of 
Section 967 through the lens of program evaluation.  This assessment 
provides a general framework for making limited observations about the 
efficacy of Section 967 and the overall nature of evaluating reform 
efforts at the SEC.  The conclusion in Part III summarizes the key 
observations made in Part II and comments generally on the prospects 
for continued SEC reform and the need for consistent SEC program 
evaluation and, therefore, enhanced congressional consideration of and 
 
10:15 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/schapiro-head-of-s-e-c-to-announce-departure/. 
 21. See Dina ElBoghdady, Mary Jo White confirmed as SEC Chief, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2013, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-08/business/38373590_1_mary-jo-white-al-franken-credit-
rating-agency-industry. 
 22. See Mari Millery, Planning for a Service Program Evaluation, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
PROGRAM EVALUATION PLANNING 63, 71 (Debra J. Holden & Marc A. Zimmerman eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE] (“Many service programs have instituted quality assurance or 
continuous quality improvement programs that intersect, and sometimes overlap, with program 
evaluation efforts in general and process evaluation efforts in particular.”). 
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responsibility for the program evaluations it sponsors. 
I. PROGRAM EVALUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
Program evaluation is a type of assessment process that has become 
standard in organizational management.  “Program evaluation is 
essential to demonstrate effective practice, advance an organization’s 
mission, and powerfully respond to one’s internal and external 
stakeholders.”23  Although the literature on program evaluation is most 
commonly applied to the assessment of social programs (especially 
human service programs), it also has been applied to the review of 
business plans and strategies, educational programs, and government 
administrative activities.  This Part briefly describes program evaluation 
both generally and in the administrative reform context. 
A. Defining Program Evaluation 
Program evaluation is a rigorous, planned, approach to assessing the 
efficacy of an organization or organizational activity.  More 
formalistically, one might describe program evaluation as “a social 
science activity directed at collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and 
communicating information about the workings and effectiveness 
of . . . programs.”24  As such, it represents an important, practical 
analytical tool in organizational and managerial studies. 
Program evaluation is applied research used as part of the managerial 
process.  Evaluations are conducted to aid those who must make 
administrative decisions about . . . programs.  Unlike theoretical research, 
where scientists engage in science for its own sake, program evaluation 
systematically examines . . . programs for pragmatic reasons.  Decision 
makers may need to know if a program accomplished its objectives, if it 
is worth funding again next year, or if a less expensive program can 
accomplish the same results.25 
Program evaluation may occur at the behest of an internal constituent of 
the organization that conducts or operates the program or as required or 
suggested by someone from outside the organization.  The person who 
 
 23. STEPHEN A. KAPP & GARY R. ANDERSON, AGENCY-BASED PROGRAM EVALUATION: 
LESSONS FROM PRACTICE 1 (2010). 
 24. PETER H. ROSSI ET AL., EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 2 (7th ed. 2003).  The 
authors of this text also offer a slightly different, but consonant definition that is useful.  “Program 
evaluation is the use of social research methods to systematically investigate the effectiveness 
of . . . programs in ways that are adapted to their political and organizational environments and are 
designed to inform . . . action . . . .”  Id. at 16. 
 25. DAVID ROYSE ET AL., PROGRAM EVALUATION: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (4th ed. 2006). 
7
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requests the assessment is known as the “evaluation sponsor.”26  The 
process of program evaluation is founded on a series of questions 
developed by the evaluation sponsor and others with interest in the 
program being evaluated, in consultation with the evaluator.27  The 
process of developing and refining these evaluation questions may 
involve both clarifying the various objectives of the constituent 
stakeholders and negotiating among those constituents to reach common 
ground.28  This development and refinement process typically involves 
inquiries into the motivation for raising the evaluation questions.29 
Although the evaluation questions are the impetus and foundation for 
the program evaluation, the overall process of program evaluation, like 
that of traditional academic research methodologies, involves planning, 
data collection, analysis, and reporting.30  As a result, the program 
evaluation process is characterized by a series of general, sequential 
steps.  One text summarizes these steps in an eight-part framework that 
comprises: 
 Identifying the evaluation question; 
 Conceptualizing the evaluation question; 
 Operationalizing the evaluation question; 
 Selecting and defining the evaluation method; 
 Selecting the sample for evaluation; 
 Collecting data; 
 Managing and analyze data; and 
 Employing the resulting information operationally.31 
Even though it is not apparent from this list of sequenced steps, the 
program evaluation process involves ongoing consultation among the 
 
 26. Id. at 18 (“The evaluation plan is generally organized around the questions posed about the 
program by those who commission the evaluation, called the evaluation sponsor, and other pertinent 
stakeholders—individuals, groups, or organizations that have a significant interest in how well a 
program functions.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
[O]ften, . . . the evaluator must negotiate with the evaluation sponsors and stakeholders 
to develop and refine the questions.  Although these parties presumably know their own 
interests and purposes, they will not necessarily formulate their concerns in ways that the 
evaluator can use to structure an evaluation plan.  For instance, the initial questions may 
be vague, overly general, or phrased in program jargon that must be translated for more 
general consumption . . . .  In such cases, the evaluator must probe thoroughly to 
determine what the question means to the evaluation sponsor and program stakeholders 
and why they are concerned about it. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 29. Id. (“Equally important are the reasons the questions about the program are being asked, 
especially the uses that will be made of the answers.”). 
 30. Id. at 16 (“[E]valuators will typically employ social research procedures for gathering, 
analyzing, and interpreting evidence about the performance of a program.”). 
 31. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 27. 
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evaluators and, more often than not, between the evaluators and various 
stakeholders.  Another program evaluation text makes this part of the 
process explicit by expressly incorporating stakeholder engagement in 
its distinctive articulation of the first five (pre-investigative) steps in the 
program evaluation process.32  Various frameworks for evaluation 
planning exist, and formal, specialized program evaluation methods and 
rubrics have been constructed for the review of specific types of 
programs (e.g., educational, public health, and human service).33 
These tailored methods and rubrics reflect an important reality of 
program evaluation: the purpose and nature of the evaluation process is 
different from program to program and context to context.34  “One of the 
most challenging aspects of program evaluation is that there is no ‘one 
size fits all’ approach.”35 
As a practical matter, an evaluation must . . . be tailored to the 
organizational makeup of the program.  In designing the evaluation, the 
evaluator must take into account any number of organizational factors, 
such as the availability of administrative cooperation and support; the 
ways in which program files and data are kept and access permitted to 
them; the character of the services provided; and the nature, frequency, 
duration, and location of the contact between the program and its 
clients.36 
Moreover, program evaluation plans are not static.  Typically, they 
are highly contextual and require revision and refinement as the 
evaluation proceeds.37  The context in which a program evaluation 
 
 32. PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 1–2 (setting forth the five steps in the Evaluation 
Planning Incorporating Context (EPIC) model: “(1) assess context, (2) gather reconnaissance, (3) 
engage stakeholders, (4) describe the program, and (5) focus the evaluation.”); see also Debra J. Holden 
& Marc A. Zimmerman, Program Evaluation Planning: Overview and Analysis, in PRACTICAL GUIDE, 
supra note 22, 143, 145–51[hereinafter Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis] (summarizing and 
commenting on the five steps in the EPIC model). 
 33. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM 
EVALUATION (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/eval/framework/index.htm; Julie A. Marshall, 
Planning for an Education Evaluation, in PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 33–61; Millery, supra 
note 22, at 63–85; Fatma Mizikaci, A Systems Approach to Program Evaluation Model for Quality in 
Higher Education, 14 QUALITY ASSURANCE IN EDUC. 37 (2006), available at 
http://www.ftsm.ukm.my/aishah/paper%20pdf_2nd%20education/Fatma_A%20systems%20approach%
20to%20program%20evaluation%20model%20for%20quality%20in%20higher%20education.pdf. 
 34. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 2 (“Evaluations are conducted for a variety of practical 
reasons: to aid in decisions concerning whether programs should be continued, improved, expanded, or 
curtailed; to assess the utility of new programs and initiatives; to increase the effectiveness of program 
management and administration; and to satisfy the accountability requirements of program sponsors.”); 
see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 12–13 (summarizing four reasons for program evaluation). 
 35. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 32. 
 36. Id. at 20. 
 37. Id. (“[O]nce an evaluation is launched, it is common for changes and ‘in-flight’ corrections 
to be required.  Modifications, perhaps even compromises, may be necessary in the types, quantity, or 
quality of the data collected as a result of unanticipated practical or political obstacles, changes in the 
9
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occurs may involve, for example, the overall ethical, political, 
economic, cultural, or social environment surrounding the program 
evaluation, the program’s activities, or the markets in which the program 
operates or the program’s activities are conducted, as well as resource or 
funding and operating concerns relating to the program.38  Program 
resource and funding issues may have particular salience in evaluation 
planning in difficult financial times because program evaluation may 
help decision makers identify where to focus or reallocate limited 
resources or when to cut ineffectual programs.39  “The ability to 
articulate the value of one’s interventions and programs and satisfy 
constituents becomes heightened when facing times of economic stress, 
difficult funding decisions, and an increased demand for services.”40 
B. Evaluation of Governmental Reform Programs 
Human service programs have been the focal point of program 
evaluation, but program evaluation has applications that extend far and 
wide—across for-profit, not-for-profit, and governmental organizations.  
To be sure, program evaluation processes “are useful in virtually all 
spheres of activity in which issues are raised about the effectiveness of 
organized social action . . . . Administrators in both the public and 
private sectors often assess the managerial, fiscal, and personnel 
practices of their organizations.”41  In fact, it can safely be said that, in 
certain governmental administrative settings, program evaluation has 
become a regular part of the ordinary course business of government.   
Evaluation has now become a political and managerial activity that makes 
 
operation of the program, or shifts in the interest of the stakeholders.”).  In sum: 
Program evaluation is not a cut-and-dried activity like putting up a prefabricated house 
or checking a document with a word processor’s spelling program.  Rather, evaluators 
must tailor the initial evaluation plan to the particular program and its circumstances and 
then typically revise and modify their plan as needed.  The specific form and scope of an 
evaluation depend primarily on its purposes and audience, the nature of the program 
being evaluated, and, not least, the political and organizational context within which the 
evaluation is conducted. 
Id. at 18. 
 38. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 1; see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 41–44 
(identifying “administrative and political context” as a factor to be taken into account in conducting a 
program evaluation). 
 39. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 15.  Specifically, one group of scholar-commentators 
contends: 
Regardless of political trends, two points seem clear about the current environment for 
evaluation.  First, restraints on resources will continue to require funders to choose 
the . . . problem areas on which to concentrate. 
Id. 
 40. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 1. 
 41. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. 
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significant input into the complex mosaic from which emerge policy 
decisions and resources for starting, enlarging, changing, or sustaining 
programs to better the human condition.  In this regard, evaluation 
research must be seen as an integral part of the social policy and public 
administration movements.42 
The use of program evaluation in assessing federal government 
programs is not new.  “Since at least the 1960s, program evaluation and 
its close companion, policy analysis, have become institutionalized 
aspects of congressional oversight and agency management of federal 
programs.” 43  Examples exist in many contexts, from the general to the 
very specific.   
The broad scope of program evaluation can be seen in the evaluations of 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which have covered the 
procurement and testing of military hardware, quality control for drinking 
water, the maintenance of major highways, the use of hormones to 
stimulate growth in beef cattle, and other organized activities far afield 
from human services.44 
Research undertaken in connection with this Article revealed an 
unsuccessful congressional attempt to legislate a federal government 
program evaluation commission.45 
Notwithstanding this history, questions remain about the relevance 
and appropriateness of applying program evaluation to governmental 
administrative reform projects in the federal agency setting.  For 
example, can financial regulatory initiatives like those pursued at the 
SEC be successful subjects of program evaluation?  They are not 
 
 42. Id. at 10–11. 
 43. ROSALIE RUEGG & IRWIN FELLER, A TOOLKIT FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC R&D INVESTMENT: 
MODELS, METHODS, AND FINDINGS FROM ATP’S FIRST DECADE 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr03-857/contents.htm; see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 12–14 
(“Evaluation activities increased rapidly during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies of the 1960s, 
when social programs undertaken under the banners of the War on Poverty and the Great Society 
provided extensive resources”); see also ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 11–15 (describing program 
evaluation at the intersection of social policy and public administration). 
 44. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.  The GAO (referenced in the text accompanying this note 
44) is guided in its evaluation efforts by Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 
(GAGAS), set forth in the so-called “Yellow Book,” that govern both financial and performance audits.  
See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2011 INTERNET 
VERSION 13 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter YELLOW BOOK], http://www.gao.gov/govaud/iv2011gagas.pdf; 
Arthur B. Laby, Implementing Regulatory Harmonization at the SEC, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 189, 
200 (2010–11).  “Performance audits provide objective analysis to assist management and those charged 
with governance and oversight in using the information to improve program performance and 
operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate 
corrective action, and contribute to public accountability.”  YELLOW BOOK, supra, at 13.  The GAO’s 
performance audit standards may provide helpful guidance to external program evaluators. 
 45. H.R. 5588, 106th Congress (2000), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr5588/text. 
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apparently “social programs,” which have historically been the focus of 
program evaluation,46 but they are seemingly “programs” in the context 
of GAO performance audits.47 
Even if we assume that substantive financial regulatory initiatives can 
be assessed productively through program evaluation, institutional 
transformation programs may not be appropriate candidates for program 
evaluation.  Are the reform efforts of administrative agencies properly 
classified as “programs” for program evaluation purposes?  “[P]rograms 
can be vague and hard to distinguish and define.”48  In the program 
evaluation context, a program is defined to include “an organized 
collection of activities designed to reach certain objectives.”49  Although 
a program typically requires its own staffing, has its own budget, and 
has its own identity within a given organizational structure, a program 
may be best defined as a collection of activities that has an identifiable, 
ongoing existence and a quantifiable, recognized influence or 
outcome.50  By these measures, a sufficiently defined plan of 
administrative reform with specific measurable objectives may be 
classified as a “program” suitable for program evaluation.51 
Program evaluation in the agency reform context can be properly 
construed as an adjunct to a managerial approach to public sector 
administrative reform.  Sometimes characterized as “New Public 
Management” (NPM), managerialist administrative reform is top-driven 
reform that incorporates structural and process modifications with the 
objective of achieving change in public sector units.52 
New Public Management—more generally known as “managerialism”—
has been defined so often by so many observers that it has become 
conceptually incoherent.  Properly understood, NPM’s focal emphasis is 
on reducing or eliminating structural distinctions between the public and 
private sectors so that the behavior of public managers resembles that of 
managers in entrepreneurial, profit-driven, investor-owned firms.53 
 
 46. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 29 (defining “social program; social intervention” as 
“[a]n organized, planned, and usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve 
social conditions.”). 
 47. See YELLOW BOOK, supra note 44, at 13 (“The term ‘program’ is used in GAGAS to include 
government entities, organizations, programs, activities, and functions.”). 
 48. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 6. 
 49. Id. at 5. 
 50. Id. at 5–7. 
 51. For example, the SEC has established a Web page collecting and identifying its “Post-
Madoff Reforms.”  See The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2013).  It is unclear that this listing, taken alone, is sufficient to evidence a program. 
 52. See Brendan C. Nolan, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE xix, xx–
xxi (Brendan C. Nolan ed. 2001). 
 53. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Sydney Stein, Jr., New Public Management Comes to America 1 
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Thus, although its definition in the abstract may be unclear, in 
practice, NPM describes an approach to public administration founded 
on a series of core, outcome-driven principles co-opted from private 
enterprise.  “NPM, like most administrative labels, is a loose term.  Its 
usefulness lies in its convenience as a shorthand name for the set of 
broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the 
bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD group of countries 
from the late 1970s.”54  Specifically, Professor Christopher Hood asserts 
that New Public Management comprises seven doctrines: 
 “‘Hands-on professional management’ in the public sector”;55 
 “Explicit standards and measures of performance”;56 
 “Greater emphasis on output controls”;57 
 “Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector”;58 
 “Shift to greater competition in the public sector”;59 
 “Stress on private-sector styles of management practice”;60 and 
 “Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.”61 
These seven doctrines are rooted in a perceived need for accountability 
and are driven by a desire for the attainment of measurable results and 
operating efficiencies.62 
 Given that NPM derives its strength from confidence in private 
enterprise management, one might expect that management failures in 
the private sector would deter the use of NPM.  Certainly, the Enron 
debacle, Martha Stewart’s legal troubles, the Bernie Madoff affair, and 
(most recently) the subprime mortgage market collapse could have been 
enough to discourage the use of private enterprise as a model for just 
about anything.  Although faith in business managers and free markets 
has suffered in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it seems that many 
 
(Harris School Series, Working Paper No. 08.04, 2006), available at 
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/working-papers/wp_08_04.pdf.  
 54. Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (1991). 
 55. Id. at 4 (“Active, visible, discretionary control of organizations from named persons at the 
top, ‘free to manage’”). 
 56. Id. (“Definition of goals, targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative 
terms, especially for professional services”). 
 57. Id. (“Resource allocation and rewards linked to measured performance; breakup of 
centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel management”). 
 58. Id. at 5 (“Break up of formerly ‘monolithic’ units, unbundling of U-form management 
systems into corporatized units around products, operating on decentralized ‘one-line’ budgets and 
dealing with one another on an ‘arms-length’ basis”). 
 59. Id. (“Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures”). 
 60. Id. (“Move away from military-style ‘public service ethic’, greater flexibility in hiring and 
rewards; greater use of PR techniques”). 
 61. Id. (“Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting 
‘compliance costs’ to business”). 
 62. Id. at 4–5. 
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of the doctrines have survived intact, and government reform efforts 
continue to rely on the values underlying NPM—albeit in a refocused 
form.63  To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of NPM64 are 
greatly exaggerated.65 
The reform efforts with which the SEC has been engaged since early 
2009 are consistent with NPM.  A number of Professor Hood’s seven 
doctrines are evidenced in those efforts.  For example, based on public 
reports, the actions of the SEC’s former Chairman, Mary Schapiro, and 
the SEC’s former Director of the Division of Enforcement, Robert 
Khuzami, in leading change at the SEC exemplify engaged, “hands-on 
professional management,” the first doctrine.66  Also, the reorganization 
of the Division of Enforcement under the leadership of former Chairman 
Schapiro and former Director Khuzami was designed to focus on the 
operations of the division and eliminate bureaucratic waste, emphasizing 
“output controls” and disaggregating operating units consistent with the 
third and fourth doctrines.67  And finally, the overall employment of 
change leadership strategies and processes derived from studies of 
private business transitions is evidence of a focus on “private sector 
styles of management practice,” the sixth doctrine.68 
Based on these collected observations, program evaluation, as a 
 
 63. See Roger Levy, New Public Management: End of an Era?, 25 PUB. POLICY & ADMIN. 234 
(2010). 
 64. See Patrick Dunleavy et al., New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era 
Governance, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 467, 468 (2006) (“The intellectually and practically 
dominant set of managerial and governance ideas of the last two decades, new public management 
(NPM), has essentially died in the water.”). 
 65. See W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE YEAR THAT DEFINED AMERICAN JOURNALISM: 1897 AND 
THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS 79 (2006).  The actual quote is: “The report of my death was an 
exaggeration.”  See id.; W. Joseph Campbell, Noting the Anniversary of Twain’s ‘Report of My Death’ 
Comment, MEDIA MYTH ALERT (June 1, 2011, 7:02 AM), 
http://mediamythalert.wordpress.com/2011/06/01/noting-the-anniversary-of-twains-report-of-my-death-
comment/.  Although Mark Twain is known to have commented along these lines more than once, the 
earliest example is in a note reportedly written by him in May 1897 relating to an extrapolation of his 
illness and death from the illness of his cousin.  Barbara Schmidt, Directory of Mark Twain’s maxims, 
quotations, and various opinions: DEATH, TWAIN QUOTES, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 55 (labeling and describing the first doctrine); Heminway, 
Reframing, supra note 6, at 637–41 (identifying various aspects of hands-on professional management 
in assessing then Chairman Schapiro and then Director Khuzami as wartime leaders and problem 
finders). 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 57 & 58 (labeling and describing the third and fourth 
doctrines); Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at 
News Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm) (describing the 
reorganization of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement). 
 68. See supra text accompanying note 60 (labeling and describing the sixth doctrine); 
Heminway, Reframing, supra note 6 (analyzing SEC reform efforts through the lens of change 
leadership literature); Heminway, Sustaining, supra note 6 (same). 
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process, has the potential to make government operations and change 
management more accountable and responsive.  As such, it has the 
capacity to be an integral part of NPM efforts and to be used to assess 
the efficacy of agency programs, including reform projects built on 
NPM doctrines and change management efforts more generally.  
Misgivings about a managerialist approach to public administration 
arising out of perceived and actual corporate mismanagement and 
agency failures preceding and contributing to the recent financial crisis 
can be displaced or resolved through effective program evaluation.  
Congressional passage of Section 967 may have had this purpose or may 
have this effect.  In addition, congressional qualms about the nature and 
effects of the SEC’s internal reform efforts may be reinforced or laid to 
rest by an external assessment built on tested social science principles 
and methodologies.  Section 967, as an example of program evaluation, 
may evidence a positive contribution to public administration and 
change management.  Query whether this potential has been achieved in 
implementation . . . .  Part II offers preliminary observations on the 
success of the program evaluation actually undertaken under Section 
967 with the thought that these observations may instruct Congress in its 
future program evaluation efforts. 
II. EVALUATING SEC OPERATIONS AND REFORM UNDER SECTION 967 
The information in Part I indicates that program evaluation may be 
useful in assessing SEC operations, including potentially the SEC’s 
current reform program.  Section 967 calls for an assessment process 
that looks like program evaluation.69  But is the study required under 
Section 967 efficacious?  Does the congressional mandate in Section 
967 set into motion a useful, constructive process of program 
evaluation?  Was the process carried out in a manner that appears 
consistent with quality program evaluation practices?  And does the 
outcome and implementation of the process appear to be appropriate and 
positive?  Even without expertise in social science research 
methodologies or public administration, a reader of the literature on 
program evaluation can make a number of relevant observations in 
response to these questions. 
A. The Overall Congressional Approach Under Section 967 
As the evaluation sponsor, Congress motivates the program 
 
 69. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 967(a)(1)–(2), 967(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 
supra text accompanying notes 2 & 3. 
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evaluation required by Section 967.  Accordingly, Congress must 
establish the scope of the evaluation, framing its focus and contents and 
isolating, or helping to isolate, the question or questions to be answered 
through the evaluation process.  These decisions are made in the context 
of Congress’s control over the SEC’s existence and authority (given that 
it and the regulatory system it monitors are congressionally created),70 as 
well as its control over funding.71  And they are made in light of 
perceived or potential failures at the SEC—problems in the execution of 
its congressional mandate. 
[P]rogram evaluation often begins by identifying a problem.  Decision 
makers want to distinguish programs that work from those that do not and 
to know if their money is well spent.  They may have developed 
questions about a program because of some incident or problems brought 
to their attention . . . .  A problem is any undesirable situation or 
condition.  Sometimes program evaluations are undertaken in order to 
determine the extent or magnitude of a problem or to confirm a suspected 
problem . . . .72 
How well did Congress do in its role as evaluation sponsor?  Did it 
adequately establish a framework for the program evaluation it 
requested in Section 967? 
Congress framed the matters it wanted studied in some detail in the 
statute.  Section 967 first references generally an examination of “the 
internal operations, structure, funding, and the need for comprehensive 
reform of the SEC, as well as the SEC’s relationship with and reliance 
on self-regulatory organizations and other entities relevant to the 
regulation of securities and the protection of securities investors that are 
under the SEC’s oversight.”73  If I understand this general aspect of 
Congress’s program evaluation directive correctly, it translates into 
several possible evaluation questions74 with overlapping areas of focus.  
One possible phrasing of these questions follows. 
 Are the internal operations, structure, and funding of the SEC 
 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. §78d (2006) (establishing the SEC); see also Heminway, Sustaining, supra 
note 6, at 9–11 (describing congressional funding authority over the SEC and its effects on SEC 
operations); James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-
effectiveness.html?pagewanted=all. 
 71. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 20 (“[A]n evaluation may be conducted because it is 
mandated by program funders and then used only to demonstrate compliance with that requirement.”). 
 72. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 15. 
 73. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1). 
 74. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the first step of the program evaluation 
process is to identify the evaluation question); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26 (“Identify the 
evaluation question is the part of the process where the general focus of the project is stated in the form 
of a research question.”) (emphasis added). 
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appropriate, effective, efficient, and sufficient based on the 
SEC’s current mandate? 
 Is there a need for comprehensive reform of the SEC in order for 
it to successfully execute its mission and fulfill its 
responsibilities? 
 Are the SEC’s relationship with and reliance on self-regulatory 
organizations and other securities regulation and investor 
protection entities under SEC oversight properly suited to its 
functions? 
The first of these possible research questions is broad enough to 
encompass the other two.  The second of these possible questions hones 
in directly on the SEC’s ongoing and prospective future reform efforts 
and, by focusing on the word “comprehensive,” seems to indicate that 
Congress is seeking information about whether those reforms ought to 
be more foundational or all-encompassing than they currently are.  The 
third of these possible questions identifies a specific aspect of the SEC’s 
current operations, stemming from the overall structure of federal 
securities regulation—the interactions between the SEC and other 
regulatory organizations in the federal regulatory system over which the 
SEC has monitoring, rule-making, enforcement, and other 
responsibilities.  This broadly worded question indicates a macro-level 
concern about the position and authority of the SEC in the federal 
system of securities regulation.  It seems reasonable, in a program 
evaluation context, to view the second and third possible research 
questions as additional information about the nature of the desired 
inquiry that helps the evaluator conceptualize the principal evaluation 
question.75 
Section 967 also sets forth more specifically the minimum required 
focuses of the mandated study.  Congress required that the study 
address: 
(A) the possible elimination of unnecessary or redundant units at the 
SEC; 
(B) improving communications between SEC offices and divisions; 
(C) the need to put in place a clear chain-of-command structure, 
particularly for enforcement examinations and compliance inspections; 
(D) the effect of high-frequency trading and other technological advances 
on the market and what the SEC requires to monitor the effect of such 
trading and advances on the market; 
 
 75. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the second step of the program evaluation 
process is to conceptualize the question); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26 (“Conceptualize the 
question puts greater detail around the question.  This step clarifies the key concepts in the evaluation 
question.”) (emphasis added). 
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(E) the SEC’s hiring authorities, workplace policies, and personal 
practices, including— 
 (i) whether there is a need to further streamline hiring authorities for 
 those who are not lawyers, accountants, compliance examiners, or 
 economists; 
 (ii) whether there is a need for further pay reforms; 
 (iii) the diversity of skill sets of SEC employees and whether the 
 present skill set diversity efficiently and effectively fosters the SEC’s 
 mission of investor protection; and 
 (iv) the application of civil service laws by the SEC; 
(F) whether the SEC’s oversight and reliance on self-regulatory 
organizations promotes efficient and effective governance for the 
securities markets; and 
(G) whether adjusting the SEC’s reliance on self-regulatory organizations 
is necessary to promote more efficient and effective governance for the 
securities markets.76 
This list identifies more specific congressional concerns about the 
SEC and its existing regulatory and reform activities and, as a result, 
offers the evaluator additional information on the objectives of the 
required study, enabling a further conceptualization of the evaluation 
question or questions.  However, some of the specified areas of concern 
are vaguer than others.  A number of the listed items identify a potential 
problem but fail to put that problem in a sufficiently detailed context.  
For example, Congress is concerned about “communications between 
SEC offices and divisions.”77  In what respect?  For what reasons?  
Similarly, Congress expresses a concern in Section 967 with the clarity 
of the SEC’s “chain-of-command structure, particularly for enforcement 
examinations and compliance inspections.”78  But Congress does not 
identify what is unclear about the current chain-of-command structure or 
why it is concerned about this lack of clarity.  Congress also fails to 
indicate the apparently unique issues relating to the chain of command 
in the Division of Enforcement that caused it to call that division out for 
special treatment in Section 967.  Without this additional contextual 
information, it will be difficult for a program evaluator to operationalize 
the evaluation question or questions and design the evaluation process—
selecting and delineating the methodology and choosing the sample to 
be studied.79 
 
 76. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2). 
 77. Id. § 967(a)(2)(B). 
 78. Id. § 967(a)(2)(C). 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 31 (noting that the third, fourth, and fifth steps of the 
program evaluation process involve operationalizing the evaluation question, selecting and defining the 
evaluation method, and selecting the sample for evaluation); KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 26–
27 (“Operationalize the question adds further detail to the question . . . .  This step defines specific 
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In operationalizing the evaluation questions and designing the 
evaluation process, one key concern is determining the type of 
evaluation to be conducted.  The literature on program evaluation 
generally defines two principal types of program evaluation.  An 
evaluation may be summative (effectiveness-oriented or impact-
oriented) or formative (process-oriented).80  A summative evaluation is 
designed to assess a program’s effectiveness.81  A formative evaluation 
focuses on assessing program implementation and improving the 
program.82   
The guidance given by the U.S. Congress in Section 967 may lend 
itself to both types of evaluation.  For example, Congress’s inquiries 
about “whether the SEC’s oversight and reliance on self regulatory 
organizations promotes efficient and effective governance for the 
securities markets”83 and “whether adjusting the SEC’s reliance on self-
regulatory organizations is necessary to promote more efficient and 
effective governance for the securities markets”84 appear to require 
summative evaluations and outcomes.  In contrast, the congressional 
directives to study “the possible elimination of unnecessary or redundant 
units at the SEC,”85 “improving communications between SEC offices 
 
concepts of the evaluation question . . . .  These initial steps [the first three steps in the evaluation 
process] set up the choice of the actual design by putting some detail around the intended question.”). 
 80. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 28–29; BLAINE R. WORTHEN ET AL., PROGRAM 
EVALUATION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 14–18 (2nd ed. 1997).  The 
summative versus formative distinction can be conceptualized as a characterization of the measurement 
of evaluation outcomes.  See Debra J. Holden & Marc A. Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning Here and 
Now, in PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 24 [hereinafter Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation 
Planning] (characterizing summative outcomes as intermediate-term/effectiveness/impact outcomes and 
formative outcomes as short-term or process-oriented outcomes). 
 81. Id. at 29 (“[A] summative evaluation . . . is focused on assessing the effectiveness of the 
program.”); see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that 
summative outcomes “are typically related to behavior or policy change, with a focus on the direct or 
indirect effects of the program on participants, as well as larger systems and possibly the community.”); 
ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 175 (“Summative program evaluation studies are those that provide an 
empirically based appraisal of the results, or final outcomes, of an innovative program.”); WORTHEN ET 
AL., supra note 80, at 14 (“Summative evaluation is conducted and made public to provide program 
decision makers and potential consumers with judgments about that  program’s worth or merit in 
relation to important criteria.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 82. Id. at 28 (noting that a process evaluation is “designed to improve the program”); ROYSE ET 
AL., supra note 25, at 116 (“Formative evaluations are employed to adjust and enhance interventions.  
They are not used to prove whether a program is worth the funding it receives but serve more to guide 
and direct programs . . . .”); WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 14 (“Formative evaluation is conducted 
to provide program staff evaluative information useful in improving the program.”) (emphasis omitted); 
Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 24 (describing formative measures as 
focused “on the process of program implementation.”). 
 83. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2)(F). 
 84. Id. § 967(a)(2)(G). 
 85. Id. § 967(a)(2)(A). 
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and divisions,”86 and “the need to put in place a clear chain-of-command 
structure, particularly for enforcement examinations and compliance 
inspections”87 seem to be directed toward process-oriented formative 
evaluation.  Congressional clarification on these judgments would be 
helpful to the program evaluator.  Presumably, this is an area in which 
ongoing consultation should be undertaken between the evaluation 
sponsor and the evaluator,88 but this is a difficult task when Congress, a 
large and diverse legislative body (comprising two houses), is the 
evaluation sponsor. 
A program evaluation also may assess outputs or effects on one or 
more levels depending on the perspectives of the constituencies to be 
served by the program and the evaluation process. 
Level refers to the focus of the evaluation in terms of whether the findings 
of greatest interest are at the individual level (i.e., the people served by 
the program), community or local level, state or regional level, or national 
level.  Each level of evaluation will have different contexts that the 
evaluator needs to understand thoroughly to effectively plan the 
evaluation.  The differing levels, for example, will influence the selection 
of stakeholders to engage in the evaluation planning process and the 
questions that will be of the greatest importance to the sponsor.89 
Because the level or levels of a particular program evaluation are 
based on the desired outcomes of the evaluation process,90 they 
necessarily reflect the nature of the evaluation questions and the type of 
program evaluation (summative or formative) being conducted.  The 
program evaluator determines the level or levels of the evaluation in 
planning the evaluation.  “The purpose of the evaluation and the 
outcomes of interest to the sponsor drive the level or focus of the 
evaluation.”91 
The program evaluation required by Section 967 manifests as a multi-
leveled process, and the BCG Report indicates it was conducted at 
several levels.92  The study areas that appear to require summative 
evaluation93 may involve analyses conducted at the level of the 
 
 86. Id. § 967(a)(2)(B). 
 87. Id. § 967(a)(2)(C). 
 88. See supra note 28. 
 89. Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 2–3; see also Holden & 
Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 15 (“‘Level’ of evaluation is a fairly complex 
concept that refers to the perspective of greatest importance to be measured through the evaluation.”). 
 90. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 15. 
 91. Id.; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 70 (“Determining the level of evaluation is parallel to 
clarifying the purpose of the evaluation.”). 
 92. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 5 (“BCG . . . conducted more than 425 discussions with the 
SEC, former SEC officials, regulated entities, peer regulators, SROs, and industry groups.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(2)(F)–(G); supra text accompanying notes 83 & 84. 
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regulatory subjects—participants in the securities markets (e.g., buyers, 
sellers, and intermediaries)—as well as at the level of co-regulators on a 
national level and Congress as the funding institution.  The evaluation 
levels of other study areas, including those that may involve more 
formative evaluation,94 are significantly harder to gauge without more 
contextual information.  In some cases, it is hard to gauge from the 
statutory provision alone what the purpose of the evaluation is and what 
outcomes may be of the most interest to Congress.95  As with the types 
of evaluation, the statute alone does not unambiguously provide 
sufficient information to permit the evaluator to definitively designate 
the levels of evaluation required or desirable.  Consultation between the 
evaluator and Congress would help clarify the evaluation levels,96 but it 
is, as earlier noted, impractical. 
The evaluation question or questions, in the context of information 
about the program itself, assist the evaluator in at least preliminarily 
assessing the type and level of evaluation to be made.97  As a result, a 
lack of clarity in evaluation questions may result in suboptimal decisions 
concerning the design and implementation of the evaluation process.  In 
Section 967, the U.S. Congress has provided the SEC and the evaluator 
important baseline information about the matters to be included in the 
study.  However, in some cases, uncertainties about the context in which 
these matters should be studied and the objectives or outcomes desired 
by Congress in requesting the study of those matters may, without more 
congressional guidance, present challenges in the evaluation process.  
Although it is common in a program evaluation process for an evaluator 
and sponsor to consult on an ongoing basis about these kinds of 
uncertainties, Congress is a large, decentralized, deliberative institution, 
making consultation difficult (if not impossible), and no consultative 
process is expressly included in Section 967.  If Congress desires to 
mandate program evaluations through the legislative process, it should 
develop or otherwise acquire enough expertise in program evaluation to 
be able to frame precise evaluation questions that best ensure an 
efficient, effective evaluation process and consider establishing a 
process for consultation in the event that questions arise. 
 
 94. See, e.g., id. § 937 (a)(2)(A)–(C); supra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 96. See supra note 28. 
 97. But cf. Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 10 (“The evaluator 
needs to plan and conduct the study in the context of the program’s people, politics, history, resources, 
constraints, values, needs, and interests.”).  Adjustments in the evaluation questions and the type and 
level of evaluation may be made over the course of the program evaluation.  See KAPP & ANDERSON, 
supra note 23, at 28–29. 
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B. The Engagement and Involvement of BCG 
Under Section 967, the SEC was required to “hire an independent 
consultant of high caliber and with expertise in organizational 
restructuring and the operations of capital markets . . . .”98  In response 
to this congressional directive, the SEC retained The Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) to perform the required study.  The BCG Report 
summarizes the findings of the study conducted by BCG in accordance 
with that engagement.  This part of the Article offers observations on the 
retention of BCG, the assessment activities of BCG, and the BCG 
Report from the perspective of program evaluation literature.  The 
purpose of this assessment is to identify and evaluate issues associated 
with the retention, monitoring, and requested outputs of external 
evaluators as a case study.  Thus case study may offer information 
useful to future program evaluations initiated by congressional action. 
1. BCG as an External Evaluator Hired by the SEC 
Program evaluations may be conducted with an evaluator internal to 
the program or with an external evaluator.99  External evaluations may 
be conducted by (among others) university researchers or private 
consultants.100  The choice of internal or external evaluation may have 
advantages and disadvantages based on context.101 
The use of an external evaluator—an independent expert consultant, 
as mandated by Section 967—has several identifiable potential 
advantages in this context.  These possible advantages include (as the 
term “independent expert consultant” suggests) offering a more 
objective evaluation and taking advantage of relevant, and possibly 
broad-based, program evaluation expertise.  However, using an external 
evaluator also may result in a more efficient and effective evaluation 
process (helping to avert undue mission-distraction for the agency) and 
may better ensure timeliness in meeting sponsor-dictated deadlines for 
completion of the review process.  An interesting aspect of the study 
required under Section 967 that may counterbalance some of these 
advantages is the separation of program evaluation sponsorship (which 
rests in Congress) from program evaluation funding (which was 
supplied under Section 967 by the SEC).  Each of these aspects of 
program evaluation in the context of Section 967 is addressed in turn in 
 
 98. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1). 
 99. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18 (“The adjectives internal and external distinguish 
between evaluations conducted by program employees and those conducted by outsiders.”). 
 100. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 89–100. 
 101. See id.; WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18–19. 
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the succeeding Subparts. 
a. Independence 
“A private consulting organization provides an external review and 
reasonably objective viewpoint that can support the credibility of the 
process and findings.”102  Dispassionate analysis is, as a general matter, 
the external evaluator’s stock in trade.103  The independent nature of an 
external evaluator’s review also may provide fresh ideas based on the 
evaluator’s own experiences in other contexts (rather than relying on the 
ideas of internal constituents), which can have both benefits and 
drawbacks.104   
Congressional concern about the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
SEC regulation and the actual and possible future effects of the SEC’s 
reform efforts make an independent review of both the SEC’s operations 
and its reform program desirable (if not necessary).  Although Congress 
did not define what it meant in its requirement that the SEC hire an 
“independent” consultant, as an external evaluator, BCG has at least 
facial independence from the SEC.  The BCG Report does note, 
however, that its knowledge and experience derives from work with 
other regulators and with entities overseen by the SEC.105 
b. Expertise 
An agency may not have or be able to afford to retain staff with 
program evaluation expertise.106  The SEC hires significant numbers of 
professionals versed in varied research areas.  However, it is unclear 
whether any SEC personnel (with the one notable exception of the 
Office of the Inspector General, which serves as a somewhat 
 
 102. Id. at 96; see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 14 (“If an 
evaluator is independent of the program, then stakeholders may be more likely to accept the findings as 
objective and valid.  Therefore, this independence can enhance the credibility of both the evaluator and 
the ultimate evaluation results.”); Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 145 
(“External evaluators are assumed to be more impartial than internal evaluators; because they have no 
stake in the evaluation results, their findings are more likely to be accepted as objective and valid.”); 
Millery, supra note 22, at 69 (“[E]xternal evaluators can lend objectivity and credibility to the 
evaluation study”). 
 103. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 18 (“Seldom is there . . . much reason to question the 
objectivity of the external evaluator . . . and this dispassionate perspective is perhaps her greatest 
asset.”). 
 104. But cf. Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 146 (noting that an 
external evaluator may, for example, need to put more effort into building relationships with 
stakeholders “in order to assure them that their input will be incorporated into the planning process.”). 
 105. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11. 
 106. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 87–88. 
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independent, expert internal evaluator107) have relevant program 
evaluation expertise, even if it were otherwise advantageous for the SEC 
to conduct its own internal evaluation of its operations and reform 
program.108  However, an agency can “gain the expertise needed to 
conduct a thorough evaluation . . . [by engaging] a consulting firm or 
private company that specializes in research.”109  The text of Section 
967 specifies the expertise that Congress required the external evaluator 
to have. 
Specifically, under Section 967, the SEC was required to hire a firm 
with “expertise in organizational restructuring and the operations of 
capital markets,” not an expertise in program evaluation.  According to 
the BCG Report, BCG was retained by the SEC based on BCG’s 
“knowledge and experience in securities markets, organizational design, 
people management, and technology—for both public and private sector 
clients.”110  A review of BCG’s Web site indicates self-assessed 
competencies in those (and other relevant) areas, with the notable 
exception of securities markets.111  BCG is a leading global business 
consulting group, and BCG was retained in 2003 to conduct a 
comparative study of the Russian securities market112 (and more recently 
 
 107. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 95–
97 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT] (describing the function and evaluation activities of the SEC Office of the Inspector 
General); see also WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 21 (noting the relatively independent internal 
evaluation function of the federal Offices of the Inspectors General); SEC 2011 Annual Report, supra, 
at 47 (noting that in 2011, the SEC Office of the Inspector General “conducted 14 audits and 
reviews . . . [covering] 17 of the 35 assessable units (49 percent).”). 
 108. The SEC has engaged in internal evaluations of its programs in the past, at least on a limited 
basis.  See, e.g., SEC 2011 Annual Report, supra note 107, at 88, 99 (describing a pilot performance 
management system in the Division of Enforcement and general internal assessment efforts). 
 109. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 96. 
 110. BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11. 
 111. See, e.g., Information Technology, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/information_technology/default.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2013); Program Management, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/operations/program_management/default.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2013); Public Sector, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/public_sector/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).  
Although there is no indication on the Web site of expertise in “securities markets,” there is evidence of 
self-reported related knowledge and experience in corporate finance, financial institutions, and the 
private equity industry.  See Corporate Finance, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/corporate_finance/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 
2013); Financial Institutions, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/financial_institutions/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 
2013); Private Equity, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/industries/private_equity/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/capabilities/corporate_finance/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 
2013). 
 112. Boston Consulting Group to Study Russian Securities Market, MONDOVISIONE (Sept. 16, 
2003), http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/boston-consulting-group-to-study-
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by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation “to conduct a business 
case study for reducing the current T+3 settlement cycle for equities and 
certain debt securities in the United States”).113  However, direct 
evidence of BCG’s expertise in capital markets or securities markets is 
not readily available. 
Two concerns emerge from these observations about the 
congressional mandate under Section 967 that the SEC retain a 
consultant with specified required areas of expertise.  First, in drafting 
Section 967, Congress did not address the need for a consultant with 
program evaluation expertise.  Instead, Congress focused exclusively on 
substantive areas of expertise relating to the SEC’s operational mission.  
More well-considered legislative drafting (reflecting, among other 
things, the need for a consultant with expertise in program evaluation) 
would remedy this type of error in the future.  Second, it is unclear 
whether the SEC complied in full with the congressional mandate to hire 
a consultant with expertise in capital markets, based on a review of 
BCG’s Web site and other publicly available information.  The 
congressional requirements for substantive expertise in Section 967 are 
somewhat vague in this regard (as to what constitutes expertise in the 
operations of capital markets), and Section 967 includes no express 
institutionalized manner of vetting the qualifications of the consultant 
(although an informal system for checking qualifications may have been 
established, and Congress retained oversight ex post by requiring that it 
receive a copy of the report). 
c. Efficacious Use of Agency Resources 
Congress, in drafting Section 967 to require the retention of an 
external evaluator, may also have wanted to keep SEC staff members 
engaged with the operation of the agency, given that the Dodd–Frank 
Act requires the SEC’s engagement with significant rule making and 
other regulatory pursuits.  Although all program evaluations are 
distracting to agency operations (in that staff members must participate 
in the process, taking them away from their regular operating activities), 
an internal evaluator typically would be required to devote substantial 
time to designing and implementing a program evaluation and may 
have—or be perceived to have—a stake in certain evaluation outcomes 
 
russian-securities-market/. 
 113. Christopher Gohlke, DTCC and Boston Consulting Group Explore US Settlement Switch, 
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that impacts program operations.114  Specifically, actual or perceived 
interest in the outcomes of the program evaluation may both 
compromise the evaluator’s ability to conduct an independent review 
and create certain expectations for the evaluator and other stakeholders 
(including agency staff) that have the potential to disrupt the operations 
of the project under study and the agency more broadly.115 
As a general matter, program evaluations can be highly political and 
threatening, and the context can make them more so.116  Staff may not 
trust the results of an internal evaluator’s assessment and may resist 
implementing reforms consistent with the study findings of an internal 
evaluator.117  On the other hand, agency staff members are more 
knowledgeable about the program at the outset (or at least may be more 
knowledgeable) and often already have connections with the 
stakeholders whose participation is needed for an effective evaluation.118  
No doubt, given the significant regulatory burdens of the SEC in the 
wake of the Madoff affair, the financial crisis, and the additional 
regulatory burdens of the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress reasoned that an 
efficient process that disrupts agency activities as little as possible and 
results in effectual implementation was attractive. 
d. Compliance with Reporting Deadlines 
The retention of an external evaluator also “may gain the agency an 
evaluator with the ability to respond to a request in a timely manner and 
to meet the time frames and requirements associated with funding and 
agency decision making.”119  Because Section 967 calls for the 
evaluation report to be issued within 150 days after retention of the 
evaluator, timing was an issue.  Staff time was in short supply because 
of the SEC’s significant engagement with rulemaking and enforcement 
activities, together with its participation in numerous congressionally 
mandated studies.120  
 
 114. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 88; see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 381 
(noting that one researcher warns internal evaluators “against confusing the interests of the organization 
with those of individual administrators with whom they identify personally”). 
 115. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 88; see also ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 381. 
 116. See ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 378–85; see also Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation 
Planning, supra note 80, at 12–13. 
 117. See Holden & Zimmerman, Overview & Analysis, supra note 32, at 145–46 (noting that 
program staff may “distrust the evaluation and become less than cooperative in planning and 
implementing it” when it is conducted by an internal evaluator). 
 118. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 86–87; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 69. 
 119. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 96. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.  
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e. Serving Two Masters? 
Finally, it is significant to note that the program evaluation sponsor is 
requesting, but not directly paying for, the study.  The U.S. Congress 
has defined the basic contents of the SEC’s program evaluation,121 but 
Section 967 calls for the SEC to hire the evaluator.122  So, while 
Congress is the sponsor of the evaluation, the SEC is the funder.  Both 
staffing and funding arrangements can impact the nature and conduct of 
a program evaluation process.123   
Program evaluators, like other service professionals, exist to provide 
valuable services to clients.124  They owe ethical responsibilities to these 
clients.125  Accordingly, the program evaluator must determine who the 
client is.126 
As an evaluation sponsor, Congress requested the study, scripted out 
its basic contents, and, along with the SEC, designated itself as a 
recipient of the resulting report.127  Congress holds the SEC accountable 
through ongoing reporting.128  BCG serves the needs of Congress as the 
sponsor of the evaluation; Congress appears to be the client in this 
engagement.  Yet, the SEC is in some senses also a client to whom some 
ethical responsibilities are owed—not merely because it funds the study, 
but also because the study serves the agency’s needs.129 
The manner in which Section 967 is drafted and the nature of the 
evaluation sponsor, agency, and evaluation process create potential 
challenges for BCG as the external evaluator.  The SEC and BCG were 
required to work together to carry out the study required by Section 967, 
independent of Congress, despite Congress’s role as the evaluation 
sponsor.130  Congress and the SEC may have different agendas, and they 
may play out in a political way in the evaluation process.  “[P]rogram 
evaluation is almost always conducted in a political arena.  A finding 
 
 121. See supra Part II(A). 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 123. See WORTHEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 19; see also Millery, supra note 22, at 68–69. 
 124. See generally KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 41 (“The primary responsibility of 
professionals is to conduct their work in such a manner as to promote the well-being of clients.”). 
 125. See id. (“There is an ethical imperative to provide interventions/programs/services that 
promote the well-being of clients; thus, determining if and to what extent such help is taking place is an 
ethical imperative . . . .”). 
 126. See id. at 42 (identifying this question). 
 127. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)–(b). 
 128. Id. § 967(c). 
 129. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 57 (“Evaluators have the ethical responsibility to 
conduct themselves in a manner that is directed by the best interests of the project.”). 
 130. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing 
different types of relationships between evaluators and sponsors and describing the roles played by 
each). 
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that pleases one group may make another group unhappy . . . .  
[P]olitical pressures will vary in strength, depending on what is at 
stake.”131  With a distant sponsor and a close working relationship 
between the evaluator and the agency, communications regarding the 
evaluation questions, process design and implementation, 
methodologies, and results may not adequately take into account the 
congressional viewpoint—to the extent that a bicameral legislature can 
identify and articulate a single viewpoint.  This makes for awkward and 
potentially inefficient communications as the study is designed and 
implemented.  Also, biases may be introduced through sponsorships and 
funding arrangements that may compromise independence and 
impartiality.132  “The wise evaluator will be sensitive to any factors 
(political or otherwise) that can affect his or her judgment.”133  
Accordingly, in its work for the SEC initiated at Congress’s behest, 
BCG was put in a tough position—one in which it likely had to guard 
against being predisposed to adopt or favor SEC attitudes or viewpoints 
because of its role, and the roles of Congress and the SEC, in the 
program evaluation process under Section 967.134 
2. The Design and Implementation of the Program Evaluation 
There is no single way to conduct a program evaluation in a particular 
context.  It would be presumptive to offer a substantive critique of 
BCG’s process in conducting the program evaluation required under 
Section 967 without the benefit of an in-depth expert analysis.  
However, it is possible for a non-expert to use norms reflected in 
program evaluation literature to identify areas of potential concern 
relating to the program evaluation process designed and implemented by 
BCG to comply with the requirements of Section 967.  A separate 
critique of the BCG Report is important (if not essential) in an 
assessment of the program evaluation mandated under Section 967.  The 
report is an integral part of the process and observations about it, like 
observations about other parts of the program evaluation process under 
 
 131. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 382. 
 132. See Millery, supra note 22, at 69 (“The evaluator should be aware of the potential biases 
introduced by the various evaluator-sponsors, and evaluation funding arrangements and should clarify 
roles and relationships early in the planning process.”). 
 133. ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 382. 
 134. Congressional and SEC attitudes or viewpoints may be transparent and public. See, e.g., 
supra text accompanying note 12 (observing the SEC’s desire for reform and overall conservatism); 
Jessica Holzer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Addressing Gaps in Analysis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2012), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304818404577348101006567024.html 
(noting congressional frustration with the SEC’s incomplete economic analyses of rulemaking and 
missed regulatory deadlines).  However, some attitudes and viewpoints may be harder to identify and 
guard against. 
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Section 967, may identify both weaknesses in the Section 967 program 
evaluation and a better way forward in future assessments of agency 
reform efforts. 
In Section 967, Congress delineates five principal areas of study: “the 
internal operations” of the SEC;135 the “structure” of the SEC;136 the 
“funding” of the SEC;137 “the need for comprehensive reform of the 
SEC;”138 and “the SEC’s relationship with and the reliance on self-
regulatory organizations and other entities relevant to the regulation of 
securities and the protection of securities investors that are under the 
SEC’s oversight.”139  Congress then sets forth seven items that must be 
included in the study.140  The BCG Report summarizes these mandates 
(indicating its awareness of them), notes that the SEC specifies four 
broad areas for study “consistent with Dodd–Frank,” and cites to the 
SEC’s “Statement of Work Form” as support for conducting its study in 
these four broad areas.141  The four areas for study include 
“Organization structure,”142 “Personnel and resources,”143 “Technology 
and resources,”144 and “Relationship with SROs.”145  The BCG Report 
identifies BCG’s focus in each area of study.146  The four areas of study 
appear to be appropriately cast to meet the congressional mandates in 
Section 967.  However, because Section 967 includes more detail than 
these summaries, there is a possibility that the changes made by the SEC 
and BCG misinterpret Congress’s intent and inadvertently exclude 
certain matters from study. 
BCG also notes certain limitations to the scope of its study: 
To carry out its mission, the SEC requires both a regulatory framework 
with clear authorizations, as well as a robust set of internal capabilities to 
fulfill this mandate.  This study focuses on the latter.  An analysis of the 
legal framework, regulatory philosophy, or performance of the SEC 
against its mission is beyond the scope of this study.147 
These limitations seem appropriate under the circumstances (avoiding 
the need for an analysis of the SEC’s legal mandate and authority) and, 
 
 135. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 141. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 11. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 12. 
 147. Id. 
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as a result, neatly dodge some of the more significant political issues 
that led to the enactment of Section 967. 
After establishing these preliminary matters, the BCG Report then 
offers details on its program evaluation design and implementation.  
BCG’s study of the SEC had four sequenced steps (modules).  First, 
BCG assessed the “implications of external forces,”148 reviewing 
information about market-based changes and challenges impacting the 
SEC.  Next, BCG engaged each of the established four areas of study by 
learning about the current state and perceived future needs of the SEC, 
conducting a gap analysis between the SEC’s current state and three 
separate metrics (“best practices,” “external benchmarks,” and “new 
requirements”), and developing related recommendations.149  Then, after 
combining and assimilating the recommendations from the four areas of 
study, BCG finalized its written report.150 
Reflecting back on the general steps in the prototypical program 
evaluation process described in Part I,151 BCG appears to be engaging in 
practices that are closely aligned with standard program evaluation 
methods.  By assessing the implications of external forces and 
undertaking to understand the current state and perceived future needs of 
the SEC, BCG conceptualized and operationalized the four areas of 
study and the evaluation questions within them.152  Its activities in this 
regard closely follow the basic steps of a standard program evaluation 
process—assessing context, gathering reconnaissance, engaging 
stakeholders, describing the program, and focusing the evaluation.153  
BCG’s reported activities also supported its choices of methodologies, 
sample selection, and data collection, management, and analysis, all of 
which are consonant with recognized stages in a program evaluation 
process.154 
The “methodologies and tools” used by BCG reflect attentiveness to 
program evaluation processes described in the literature.  Methods and 
instruments used in program evaluation are chosen to address 
information needs that correspond and respond to the evaluation 
 
 148. Id. at 13. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 14. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32. 
 152. See ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 16 (“[E]valuators will typically employ social research 
procedures for gathering, analyzing, and interpreting evidence about the performance of a program.”). 
 153. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 2 (setting forth the five steps in the Evaluation 
Planning Incorporating Context (EPIC) model: “(1) assess context, (2) gather reconnaissance, (3) 
engage stakeholders, (4) describe the program, and (5) focus the evaluation.”); see also Holden & 
Zimmerman, Overview and Analysis, supra note 32, at 145–51 (summarizing and commenting on the 
five steps in the EPIC model).  See supra note 32. 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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questions and the type and level of evaluation in the context of the 
program being evaluated.  “[A]gency factors influence the choice and 
implementation of various methodologies.”155  The evaluator must 
determine the basic information needed to effectively answer each 
evaluation question and must identify whether and, if so, how that 
information may be obtained.156 
Evaluators must often innovate and improvise as they attempt to find 
ways to gather credible, defensible evidence . . . .  The circumstances 
surrounding specific programs, and the particular issues the evaluator is 
called on to address, frequently compel evaluators to compromise and 
adapt textbook methodological standards.  The challenges to the evaluator 
are to match the research procedures to the evaluation questions and 
circumstances as well as possible and, whatever procedures are used, to 
apply them at the highest possible standard feasible to those questions 
and circumstances.157 
To make this connection between evaluation questions and evaluation 
methodologies, an evaluator may begin by interviewing important 
stakeholders to assemble a composite picture of each program being 
studied.158  “These interviews are typically informal and unstructured 
and usually include a series of basic questions that encourage 
stakeholders to tell the evaluator about the more significant aspects of 
the program from their point of view.”159 
After meeting with key stakeholders, the evaluator thoroughly reviews 
program documentation and other literature related to the program and its 
proposed outcomes.  At the same time, the evaluator may interview key 
staff and program stakeholders to understand the history and evolution of 
the program, develop logic models or conceptual frameworks to visually 
depict how the program is thought to function, and create tools that begin 
to specify the potential issues of interest for the evaluation.160 
This picture of the program enables the evaluation by setting baseline 
descriptions of the operation of the program (sometimes collected in the 
form of a program logic model summarizing the program’s resources, 
activities, processes, and outcomes161), connecting (as and if applicable) 
 
 155. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 34. 
 156. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 27 (“The evaluator needs 
to assess each question to determine if data sources for answering it are available or if the available 
resources allow for collection of those data sources.”). 
 157. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 17. 
 158. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 133–34 (“At the beginning of an evaluation project, it 
is fairly standard to ask a variety of stakeholders, people with an interest in the program . . . about the 
program.”). 
 159. Id. at 134. 
 160. Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 20–21. 
 161. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 136–50 (describing and illustrating how differing 
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the program to its greater public context,162 and helping the agency and 
evaluator identify the information that is needed to answer the 
evaluation questions and potential sources of that information.163  This 
program description creates a foundation for the study. 
The process that BCG undertook to learn about the operations and 
requirements of the SEC and the related gap analyses164 both launched 
and comprised part of BCG’s assessment of the SEC.  This process 
consisted of document review and analysis and interviews and 
discussions with various stakeholders.165  Based on the information 
BCG obtained from these activities, BCG employed various 
methodologies and assessment tools to conduct necessary and desirable 
analyses of the acquired data.166 
BCG’s design and implementation of the SEC study under Section 
967 appear to be both identifiable as program evaluation and consistent 
with the rigor expected of good program evaluation.  The design of the 
study is directed at the matters called out by Congress for analysis, and 
the planning and conduct of the study follow recognizable program 
evaluation patterns.  However, a more substantive analysis of BCG’s 
study design and implementation is advisable given the required 
diversion of resources by the SEC as the subject and object of the 
process.  A valid program evaluation process should generate valid 
results that can be used to improve the structure and operations of the 
SEC.167  A faulty program evaluation process may be manifested 
through a suboptimal evaluation design and report and may result in an 
inefficient use of agency resources. 
3. The BCG Report 
Program evaluation processes culminate with the issuance of reports.  
“Once the evaluation has been completed, the information needs to be 
shared in a manner that will most likely complement its eventual use.”168  
 
viewpoints about a program can be fashioned into a program logic model and used to assess the 
program). 
 162. See Holden & Zimmerman, Evaluation Planning, supra note 80, at 21–22 (describing how 
the information in a program logic model may be “collated, collected and integrated to form a 
conceptual model of the intended processes of the program.”). 
 163. See KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 150–54 (describing and illustrating how a program 
logic model can help identify information needs and potential and actual information sources). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
 165. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 14. 
 166. See id. at 14–18.  The analyses are described in detail in the Appendix included as chapter 7 
of the BCG Report.  See id. at 155–260. 
 167. See generally KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 29 (“[T]he purpose of a program 
evaluation is the generation of quality information for the improvement of services.”). 
 168. Id. at 325. 
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These reports have somewhat standardized components: an introduction 
(which may include or consist of an executive summary of the report); a 
literature review; a description of the study methodologies, findings, and 
recommendations; and relevant appendices.169  The structure of the BCG 
Report conforms to this normative description.  It comprises seven 
chapters: an executive summary; chapters on the scope of and approach 
to the study, the context of the study, BCG’s assessment of each area of 
study, the strategic direction of the SEC, and recommended initiatives; 
and an appendix including details and a glossary.170 
To be most effective, the process of producing the evaluation report 
should engage key stakeholders: 
End users of information can be great resources in the overall report 
production process.  Reports are often produced in stages, a format that 
provides an opportunity for feedback and discussion of findings before a 
final report is disseminated.  Evaluators develop and give users a draft of 
the evaluation report for feedback.  The reviews of the draft report 
usually generate valuable discussion about the findings and possible use, 
as well as the actual written product.171 
The BCG Report indicates that a draft version of the report was 
produced during the third module of the study and finalized in the fourth 
module.172  Although the BCG Report does not indicate that feedback 
was solicited from key personnel at the SEC (or Congress) before the 
report was finalized, BCG’s work may also have conformed to this 
standard practice.  Congress can evaluate this aspect of the study 
process, if it desires to do so, through the mandated system of post-
evaluation reporting it established in Section 967. 
C. Post-Evaluation Implementation and Periodic Reports 
Section 967 institutes a post-evaluation reporting system designed to 
allow Congress to remain informed about the SEC’s implementation of 
BCG’s recommendations.173  Section 967 calls for the SEC to report to 
Congress every six months during the two-year period after the release 
of the BCG Report.174  This reporting schedule presumably is designed 
to ensure that the evaluation process and report are appropriately 
utilized, a common concern in program evaluation processes.175 
 
 169. Id. at 333–34; ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 395–404. 
 170. See BCG Report, supra note 4, at 3–4 (the table of contents of the report). 
 171. KAPP & ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 332. 
 172. BCG REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
 173. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(c). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See ROYSE ET AL., supra note 25, at 410 (“One of the most disappointing things that can 
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Imagine that the evaluators have brought a full bucket of water to the 
project leader on a scorching hot day.  Someone has to reflect on how the 
water will be used and then take action to pour it into glasses, drink it, use 
it to water the plants, or bathe with it, otherwise it will just sit there and 
evaporate until it is no longer useful to anyone.176 
The post-evaluation process described in Section 967 is part of a 
“feedback loop” that ties the agency’s “internal learning” to “external 
sharing” with stakeholders.177  By inserting this feedback loop in Section 
967, Congress (whether unwittingly or purposefully) broadly invoked 
the spirit, even if not the letter, of utilization-focused evaluation by 
explicitly investing the SEC in the evaluation process.178 
In any evaluation there are many potential stakeholders and an array of 
possible uses.  Utilization-focused evaluation requires moving from the 
general and abstract, i.e., possible audiences and potential uses, to the real 
and specific, i.e., actual primary intended users and their explicit 
commitments to concrete, specific uses.  The evaluator facilitates 
judgment and decision making by intended users rather than acting as a 
distant, independent judge.  Since no evaluation can be value-free, 
utilization-focused evaluation answers the question of whose values will 
frame the evaluation by working with clearly identified, primary intended 
users who have responsibility to apply evaluation findings and implement 
recommendations.179 
The inclusion of this aspect of program evaluation in Section 967 has 
apparent benefits in, among other things, fostering transparency in a way 
that better assures the accountability of the SEC and Congress to the 
public and better ensures the ongoing use of BCG’s findings and 
recommendations, enhancing prospects for SEC reform in accordance 
with those findings and recommendations.180  Although it may be that 
BCG in fact employed a utilization-focused evaluation process, more 
conscious and explicit focus by Congress in Section 967 on the 
utilization of the SEC study would have better ensured that a utilization-
 
happen to an evaluator is that the evaluation report . . . is placed on a bookshelf or filed away to be 
seldom noticed or referred to again.”); see also Michael Quinn Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation, 
in EVALUATION MODELS: VIEWPOINTS ON EDUCATIONAL AND HUMAN SERVICES EVALUATION 425 
(D.L. Stufflebeam et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
 176. CHEYANNE CHURCH & MARK M. ROGERS, DESIGNING FOR RESULTS: INTEGRATING 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMS 179 (2006), available at 
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Patton, supra note 175, at 427–29 (describing the “personal factor” in utilization-focused 
evaluations). 
 179. Id. at 425–26. 
 180. See generally CHURCH & ROGERS, supra note 176, at 179 (“Sharing the evaluation results 
and the subsequent reflections and adaptations to the project externally increases transparency between 
the organization and its stakeholders and donors.”). 
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focused process was employed and the attendant potential benefits were 
most fully realized. 
Even absent a utilization-focused evaluation, however, there are 
acknowledged steps that can be taken in the context of Section 967 to 
make optimal use of BCG’s observations and employ BCG’s 
recommendations.  One program evaluation resource, for example, 
suggests the use of a four-step process, emanating from learning theory, 
to utilize the output of a program evaluation—a process that commences 
during the evaluation process and extends through the issuance of the 
evaluation report and into the implementation phase. 
First, the project team goes through the experience of the evaluation—
preparation, evaluation plan, process, debrief and review of the final 
report.  The team then reflects on the conclusions and recommendations, 
and generalizes the information beyond the immediate project.  From 
there the focus shifts to how this newly acquired knowledge should be 
applied to the project or beyond.  Finally, the team considers what needs 
to be shared with other teams, with the broader organization, and with the 
field as a whole.181 
A process like this could work well with the ongoing reporting 
responsibilities of the SEC under Section 967.  In fact, as the SEC stated 
in its first Section 967 report to Congress, the SEC did reflect on the 
observations and suggestions made by BCG in the BCG Report, 
generalize that information, and design an implementation plan that 
engages multiple stakeholders.182  “Efforts have focused on putting the 
right people, infrastructure and processes into place to support an effort 
that has the potential to re-shape how the SEC executes its mission 
through redefined processes, roles and responsibilities, and enhanced 
engagement with internal and external stakeholders.”183  As part of this 
planning process, the resulting SEC reform project was institutionalized 
and named—the Mission Advancement Program, or MAP.184 
In order for the agency to adopt and “own” the implementation of agreed-
upon BCG recommendations, a program name (moving away from “BCG 
Study” or “BCG Recommendations”) was developed to give an identity 
to the initiative as well as set the stage for the multi-year program.  With 
the adoption of an identity and vision, the program was formally 
designated the “Mission Advancement Program” (MAP).  MAP 
acknowledges where the agency is today and how it will continue to 
move forward in support of its mission.  The vision of MAP is “to 
 
 181. Id. at 180. 
 182. See September 2011 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 3–4, 8–25 (summarizing and detailing the 
establishment of infrastructure, processes, and workflows to implement the BCG Report). 
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Id. at 10. 
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effectively align [the agency’s] resources against the SEC’s most critical 
responsibilities and enable the SEC to continue to evolve as a premier 
regulator that is agile and equipped to evolve in pace with the securities 
market.”185 
The SEC’s second Section 967 report to Congress describes overall 
progress made in executing the four agendas represented in the MAP,186 
noting improvements to SEC operations in three areas: infrastructure 
reorganization, efficiency and effectiveness process review, and the 
identification of cost-saving opportunities.187 
However, the second Section 967 report also cautions that “[h]aving 
completed the initial stages of review and analysis, it is anticipated that 
the level of activity related to MAP projects will be reduced in FY 
2012.”188  The report identifies the reasons for this abatement.189 
Staff and management time to devote to this initiative will continue to be 
in short supply, and future phases of implementation are likely to require 
levels of funding that must be directed at other agency priorities at this 
time.  For this reason, future activity will be focused on a limited number 
of projects from among those initiatives described below based on an 
assessment of their relative potential for operational impact or cost 
savings.  In the coming months, the working groups will continue to 
assess the changes suggested by BCG to refine and identify those that 
would provide the most benefit to the SEC and the public.190 
Later in the report, the SEC explains these challenges in greater detail 
and notes a third, related challenge: limits on the SEC’s ability to 
effectively absorb and manage change.191  The report concludes: 
The last six months have seen notable progress as agency staff have 
worked to solve problems and initiate tangible improvements in people, 
process and technology domains.  However, the agency faces an 
extraordinary workload and resource demands in the coming months and 
will necessarily be selective in pursuing further only those initiatives that 
will result in measureable efficiency and effectiveness gains or cost 
savings.192 
This conclusion and the challenges it reflects represent a somewhat 
sobering reality in the program evaluation process required and fostered 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. See March 2012 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 7–59. 
 187. Id. at 4–5. 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 60–62 (describing challenges involving financial and human resources and change 
absorption). 
 192. Id. at 62. 
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under Section 967.  The SEC has a larger and more complex mission to 
fulfill as it continues the process of reforming itself.  The second Section 
967 report indicates that, failing the introduction of new resources, the 
SEC may be forced to make difficult decisions between meeting its 
regulatory mandate and pursuing its reform efforts. 
The third SEC report under Section 967 was issued in October 2012.  
It indicates a continued concern about balancing the SEC’s regulatory 
and reform tasks, although it paints a rosier picture of these concerns 
and boasts significant progress in implementing the BCG Report 
recommendations.193  Specifically, the report notes (among other things) 
that, “in order to balance the MAP activities with additional work 
dictated by the Dodd–Frank Act, and the agency’s many other ongoing 
obligations, the SEC has prioritized its efforts toward implementing 
those initiatives yielding the greatest potential for more immediate 
operational impact activities.”194  According to the report, “the activities 
are now being executed primarily by SEC staff, with program 
management support as required, resulting in a reduction in related 
agency expenditures by more than 90%.” 
But a different possible story is told by Representative Darrell Issa, 
Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, in a January 3, 2013 letter to 
Chairman Walter.195  The letter questions the level of spending on 
outside consultants in connection with the MAP and the necessity of 
retaining those consultants.196  Although hearings had not been held or 
scheduled to sort through the details on this matter at the time work on 
this Article was completed (mid-April 2013), the combined information 
in the third SEC report under Section 967 and the January letter from 
Representative Issa may suggest that former Chairman Schapiro, finding 
insufficient human resources within the SEC to execute on both agency 
rulemaking projects under Dodd–Frank and agency reform initiatives 
occasioned by the SEC Report, made the decision to retain extra human 
resources in the form of outside project management consultants.  Even 
 
 193. October 2012 SEC Report, supra note 10, at 44–45. 
 194. Id. at 45. 
 195. Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Elisse Walter, Chairman, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 3, 2013), at 2–3, 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/Rep.Issa.Letter.to.SEC.010313.pdf (raising concerns about 
the cost of the “program management” services provided by outside consultants at Booz Allen 
Hamilton, Inc. in connection with the MAP); see also Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Panel Probes SEC 
Spending on Consultants, REUTERS (Jan 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-sec-
consultants-idUSBRE9030V320130104. 
 196. Sarah N. Lynch, As Booz Allen Consults SEC Critics Question Cost, REUTERS (March 1, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/booz-allen-sec_n_1311905.html (stating that the 
retention of the consultants “was essential because the SEC simply did not have the manpower or 
experts on hand to conduct the follow-up work”). 
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in the face of an ostensibly well-grounded rationale of this kind, 
however, the ongoing management and oversight of the consultants’ 
activities and cost would be at issue.  Of course, a thinly staffed SEC 
also might make this type of management and oversight impossible . . . . 
At the time work on this Article was completed, the final report of the 
SEC under Section 967 had not yet been issued.  Perhaps this final 
report will shed further light on the question of resource allocations 
made in connection with Section 967 compliance.  Perhaps it will not.  
In any event, the financial and human resources expended in 
implementing a reform plan through a mandated reporting system may 
be significant. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I started my research on this Article wondering whether Section 967 
represented a positive development in the SEC’s ongoing efforts at 
reform.  I knew from my prior work that the SEC had a desire for reform 
and had made progress in instituting its own program of reform in the 
absence of a congressional pronouncement.197  In the early days after the 
adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act, I identified certain potential positive 
effects of Section 967 on the SEC’s reform efforts based on elements of 
change leadership literature.198  I questioned, however, whether the 
SEC’s conservatism,199—together with (potentially) the under-resourced 
environment in which the SEC currently operates,200 the nature and 
extent of Congress’s engagement with the reform effort through Section 
967,201 and the sheer weight of the number of studies and reports that 
involve the SEC as provided under the Dodd–Frank Act, the JOBS Act, 
and the STOCK Act (not to mention the weight of rule-making and 
enforcement obligations under these laws and otherwise)202—might 
negatively impact the SEC’s change momentum.  After fumbling for an 
assessment rubric that might help me to assess the efficacy of Section 
967, I turned to the literature on program evaluation, which seemed to 
most closely describe the context in which Section 967 was intended to 
operate.  To ensure that I was headed down the right path, I consulted 
public administration literature to confirm that program evaluation 
operated in that context as well as in the private sector. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when viewed through the lens of program 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
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evaluation, Section 967 gets mixed reviews.  On the one hand, Section 
967 successfully engages the basic elements of program evaluation, and 
BCG executed on those basic elements in a manner that comports with 
descriptions of valid program evaluation in the relevant literature.  On 
the other hand, BCG’s work may or may not be of high quality (there is 
no plan for or apparent expertise in a substantive evaluation of BCG’s 
work), and the specifics of Section 967 raise some interesting, and 
potentially important, issues from a program evaluation standpoint.  Part 
II of this Article covers these points in detail. 
For instance, Congress could have been more precise in framing its 
evaluation questions—the matters to be studied—to clarify the purpose 
of the evaluation mandated under Section 967 and the outcomes of 
interest to it.  This is especially important given the relatively distant 
nature of Congress as a program evaluation sponsor and the SEC’s 
multiple roles as funder, subject, and object of the program evaluation.  
Additional specificity and related congressional guidance on the 
evaluation questions would have established a more robust foundation 
for the type and level of evaluation to be conducted and the information 
needs to be met by the evaluation process.  Further, more precise 
evaluation questions may have bolstered BCG’s independence in 
conducting the evaluation. 
Also, while the specification of an external evaluator has salient 
advantages in the context of the program evaluation required under 
Section 967, the directive on the retention of an appropriate consultant 
in Section 967 could have specified the need to hire a consultant with 
program evaluation expertise and could have better described what 
constitutes “expertise . . . in the operation of capital markets.”203  
Although there may have been no detriment suffered in this case as a 
result of these deficiencies, they may contribute to the retention of the 
wrong type of evaluator. 
Finally, the program evaluation process mandated under Section 967 
could have been expressly designed to more comprehensively bring into 
play a utilization-focused program evaluation process, working in more 
explicit, pervasive feedback loops between BCG and the SEC to better 
ensure short-term and long-term use of BCG’s observations and 
recommendations.  Although the post-evaluation reporting system 
ensures that the SEC will address with Congress its use of these outputs 
for a period of two years, the reform process is likely to extend beyond 
that period.  The tone of the second Section 967 report is decidedly 
cautious and evidences a conservative approach to implementing 
 
 203. Dodd–Frank Act, § 967(a)(1). 
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reforms on an ongoing basis.204  Having said that, however, the SEC’s 
first three Section 967 reports indicate that it is committed to continue 
the process of reform subject to its ability to do so given the SEC’s 
capacity to absorb and manage change and competing needs for the 
SEC’s human and money capital.  These efforts, however, come at a 
cost, and that cost includes the allocation of internal or external human 
capital to ongoing reporting and implementation mandates.  Whether the 
SEC’s desire for positive change survives and its reform program thrives 
to bring the SEC to new regulatory heights—in light of its conservatism, 
underfunding, need to continue to comply with the reporting mandates 
of Section 967, and accumulated study fatigue—remains to be seen.  
Moreover, the overall costs and benefits of the reform efforts mandated 
under Section 967 have not yet been assessed, and it is unclear whether 
plans for that type of comprehensive assessment exist. 
In sum, while program evaluation literature provides a touchstone for 
making observations about whether Section 967 is an effectual piece of 
legislation, the non-expert observations that can be made on the basis of 
that literature are necessarily limited.  This Article does not permit a 
conclusion, for example, as to whether the reform efforts undertaken in 
response to the BCG Report result in short-term or long-term benefits to 
investors, issuers, or others served by the SEC’s programmatic mission 
or as to whether the aggregate benefits of Section 967 exceed its total 
costs. 
Yet, the literature on program evaluation underscores its potential 
importance as a tool of responsible, effective administration and 
oversight of government programs. 
[T]he role of evaluation is to provide answers to questions about a 
program that will be useful and will actually be used.  This point is 
fundamental to evaluation—its purpose is to inform action.  An 
evaluation, therefore, primarily addresses the audience (or, more 
accurately, audiences) with the potential to make decisions and take 
action on the basis of the evaluation results.  The evaluation findings may 
assist such persons to make go/no-go decisions about specific program 
modifications or, perhaps, about initiation or continuation of entire 
programs.  They may bear on political, practical, and resource 
considerations or make an impression on the views of individuals with 
influence.  They may have direct effects on judgments of a program’s 
value as part of an oversight process that holds the program accountable 
for results.  Or they may have indirect effects in shaping the way program 
issues are framed and the nature of the debate about them.205 
Accordingly, program evaluation should be used more consciously and 
 
 204. See, e.g., text accompanying note 180. 
 205. ROSSI ET AL., supra note 24, at 20. 
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on an informed, consistent basis—not just for the purpose of gauging 
SEC reform, but also for the overall assessment of government 
programs, including federal agency operations and reform efforts. 
The conscious, informed, and consistent use of program evaluation 
will require, however, a sharpened focus on important unresolved 
questions underlying federal agencies and their activities—questions 
about the nature of efficient and efficacious agency operations and 
regulation.  These questions have economic, political, and social roots 
and implications too complex to digest here.  But without attention to 
these important questions, congressionally sponsored program 
evaluation is an unanchored ship adrift in the vast sea of our federal 
government.206 
In an imaginary, idealized world free of transaction costs, agency 
costs, political biases, and cognitive biases, a thoughtful, engaged 
program evaluation process would support and strengthen agency 
initiatives like the SEC’s pre-existing reform program to the betterment 
of the overall regulatory scheme and for the benefit of its protected 
individuals and groups.  Because our world is not free from these costs 
and biases, however, Congress should ensure, before it mandates 
expenditures for an agency program evaluation, that it participates in the 
sponsorship of that program evaluation in an aware, advised manner, 
sensitive to the potential intricacies, benefits, and perils of that 
evaluation process.  Congress can develop (through internal talent or by 
retaining outside experts) structures and protocols for the conduct of 
federal agency program evaluations and appropriate rubrics and tools 
(including detailed, context-driven checklists of the components of a 
quality program evaluation) to assess the efficacy of those program 
evaluations in different contexts.207  This Article expresses support for 
the thoughtful development of those structures, protocols, rubrics, and 
tools as a means of better ensuring the optimal use of program 
evaluations in public administration at the federal level. 
  
 
 206. Cf. RUEGG & FELLER, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that the institutionalization of program 
evaluation in the U.S federal government “is not synonymous with acceptance, quality, credibility, or 
impact.”). 
 207. The GAO’s GAGAS for use in performance audits may provide some guidance in this 
regard.  See supra note 44. 
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